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'Cosmopolitical economy . . . that science which
teaches how the entire human race may attain
prosperity'. 'Political economy . . . that science
which limits its teaching to the inquiry how a given
nation can obtain (under the existing conditions of
the world) prosperity, civilisation, and power, by
means of agriculture, industry, and commerce'.
[List (1885) 1966:119]
For Friedrich List, concerned above all with how
Germany could develop manufacturing industry at a
time when British manufactures were sweeping all
before them, the distinction between these two kinds
of economics was vital. What we know as classical
economics was, of course, List's 'cosmopolitical
economy'. It operated on the Enlightenment
assumption of citizens of the world as economic men,
seeking competitive advantage in free international
and internal trade. Marxian economics introduced
class distinctions, but gave the division of citizens of
the world into nations no more significance than it had
in classical economics.
List's 'political economy' remains to this day
unelaborated. In the post-Second World War era,
when the role of sovereign (often newly sovereign)
states in conditioning the market has become
unavoidably apparent to any reader of newspapers,
economics still prefers to speak of the various systems
of 'political economy' mainly (though not entirely) for
the purpose of demonstrating their inefficiency. It is
true that development economics has debated
seriously the idea that what is best for advanced and
powerful countries is not necessarily best for poor and
weak countries. But even within development
economics there has lately been a powerful reassertion
of the argument that global production would be
maximised if all countries, including the poor and
weak, followed free trade principles. Even if not all
other countries follow these principles, the argument
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runs, it is still in the best interests of the citizens of any
one poor country that its government should follow
the principles of free trade domestically and inter-
nationally. And much of the evidence for this
proposition is said to come from the capitalist states of
East Asia [Little 1982].
East Asia is undoubtedly the fastest growing region of
the world - with (although this is not a point that
neoclassical interpretations emphasise) socialist China
and North Korea also turning in relatively fast growth
by international standards. In the socialist states, the
principals of market economics have (until recently)
been decisively rejected and there has been all-
encompassing state involvement in the economy. But
if we turn to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, among
the most dramatic and equitable cases in the history of
capitalist development, industrialisation has in each
case been accompanied by aggressive government
intervention. The authorities have acted to guide
markets and modulate the competitive process in a
way that neoclassical economics says public officials
cannot get right.
The papers in this Bulletin focus on different aspects of
the historical experience of state economic involvement
in three East Asian NICs, one socialist (China) and
two capitalist (Taiwan and South Korea). Taking the
two capitalist cases first, state economic involvement
has been thorough-going in both (though with
important differences): officials have imposed strict
controls on flows of investment funds and have acted
systematically to change the incentive structures of
commodity markets in pursuit of national economic
priorities. They have not only intervened to determine
the evolving structure of the domestic economy, but
also to capture the potential benefits offered by
foreign capital and commodity markets by setting
favourable terms of interaction conducive to strategic
national goals.
As the case studies in this issue demonstrate, the
Korean and Taiwanese Governments may well have
'got the prices right' in certain important areas but this
is only one part of a larger developmental story. State
economic action has extended beyond the conventional
arsenal of 'parametric' controls: through direct public
ownership (particularly substantial in Taiwan),
investment strategy, multifaceted import restrictions,
direct negotiations with foreign companies and, in the
Korean case, even direct coercion against sections of
the business class! The distinction between 'public'
and 'private', so central to conventional economic
theory, has been blurred and the role of intermediate
organisations (such as industry and farmers' asso-
ciations), hybrid state/private institutions acting as
'transmission belts' between state and economy, has
also been important, especially in Korea.
In the process of what Michell calls 'government-led
growth', state action has in the main been guided by
certain strategic considerations. The state has
influenced the structure of the economy by regulating
the terms of interaction between industry and
agriculture (Moore), by protecting infant industries
(Fransman), by choosing key industrial sectors for
expansion (Jacobsson on the machine-tool industries
in Korea and Taiwan and Enos on Korean
petrochemicals) and by anticipating future needs in
key sectors (Wade on the nuclear and petrochemicals
industries in Taiwan). Both governments have
recognised the cardinal importance of technological
change and have promoted it actively through
investment and manpower policies, a selective import
regime and controls over foreign capital. The
underlying aim throughout has been to assert the
primacy of national economic interests and to develop
relatively comprehensive and dynamic economies
which, while heavily reliant on external transactions,
can respond flexibly to fluctuations in international
markets.
The crucial importance of state action in East Asian
capitalist development becomes clearer if we go
beyond the narrow sphere of economic policy to the
domains of social structure, ideology and culture, and
politics. As the articles by Hamilton and Moore
suggest, economic development embodies fundamental
social and political changes. In both Taiwan and
South Korea, the state has acted to change class
structures and establish political conditions conducive
to rapid industrialisation - through major social
reforms such as land reform, by subordinating the
agricultural population in the first phase of
industrialisation, through authoritarian political
systems, nationalist ideological mobilisation and
repressive (and in the Korean case intermittently
brutal) controls over labour. It is important to realise
that the relative 'freedom' of labour markets was
maintained by political unfreedom.
In List's terms, Korea and Taiwan are prime cases of
'political economy'. Their experience, and their
success, tïts only partially with the theorems of
neoclassical economists (Fransman provides an
account of the latter). On the other hand, while it
would be incorrect to describe the action of the
Taiwanese and Korean states as simply 'market
conforming', they have both shown considerable
sensitivity to the benefits of market signals. Their real
achievement has lain in their ability to both implement
national planning priorities and expose their economies
to market disciplines, especially international (for
example, linking import licences to export per-
formance). They demonstrate the unsoundness of any
simple counter-position of state/private, or
plan/market, and suggest that, in these cases at least,
spectacularly successful industrialisation has been
accompanied by an apparently judicious combination
of both.
The same point is supported from an opposite
perspective by the experience of Chinese industrial-
isation. The Chinese model, though modified to some
extent by successive reforms, retained the basic
elements of Soviet central planning whereby both
macro and micro economic processes of production,
distribution, exchange and accumulation were over-
whelmingly subject to direct politico-administrative
regulation. Though this played a positive role in the
early stages of industrialisation, laying the basis for a
relatively comprehensive modern economy, the
economic costs of a heavily 'statist' mode of
development became increasingly apparent and the
pressures for reform ineluctable [see the articles by
Gray and White]. In the post-Mao era, Chinese
socialist economists and (to a lesser degree) policy-
makers have become increasingly aware of the need to
enliven the economy by increasing the decision-
making autonomy of economic agents and con-
structing a complementary relationship between a
reformed (and curtailed) planning system and
revitalised markets. The aim, if not the current reality,
is a guided market, modulated by the state in ways
which bear a family resemblance to the situations we
have identified in South Korea and Taiwan (not to
mention Japan). We see, in short, a certain degree of
convergence in economic systems, which straddles
(but may eventually serve to diminish) the gulf
between competing political-ideological systems.
While analysis of the deficiencies of socialist central
planning falls on ready ears, our argument about the
positive role of pervasive state intervention in
capitalist East Asia is rhore contentious. Part of our
case is brutishly empirical: the actual range and depth
of state involvement in industrialisation has been far
greater than most conventional economic analyses
would allow. A case in point is Luedde-Neurath's
analysis of the alleged 'liberal' nature of South Korea's
policies towards foreign investment. This empirical
evidence at least allows us to make the negative
argument that Taiwan and South Korea cannot be
used to support the generalised case that if only the
government of a developing country 'gets the prices
right', then that country too can expect the marvellous
growth of Taiwan and South Korea. The governments
of these countries have done much more than get the
prices right (plus of course provide infrastructure and
maintain a macro balance). Without these other
things, getting prices right may have no more effect
than pushing a piece of string.
But the association of pervasive state intervention
with successful industrialisation does not amount to
an explanation of the latter. Even if it did, moreover,
we would still have to explain why East Asian
capitalist states have been so effective while their
counterparts in other developing (and developed)
countries have been far less so. These are both difficult
questions and the answers to them obviously affect the
validity of any general lessons to be drawn from the
East Asian capitalist NICs. As Fransman points Out,
there is no shortage of alternative explanations of their
success and it is hard to identify the precise impact of
state action (as Wade reminds us with his allusion to
Jacques Rueff's epithet about the relationship
between a cock-crow and the dawn).
Several of our authors address this issue, more or less
explicitly. They allow that certain policies have
brought economic costs (for example, Jacobsson's
critique of the impact of import restrictions on the
machine tool sector) and there is ample evidence of
official miscalculations (for example, early agricultural
policy and the Heavy and Chemical Industrial Plan in
Korea). But they tend to agree that the state's attempt
to impose a longer-term rationality on the industrial-
isation process through a combination of public
power and market allocation has been successful in net
terms. Fransman, for instance, commends the Korean
success in nurturing infant industries. Luedde-
Neurath concludes that, on balance, the development
of indigenous Korean industry owes much to the
government's policy of screening, and controlling,
direct foreign investment. Enos attempts a more
precise evaluation of the Korean government's
policies on technology transfer, ending with the
tentative conclusion that these were both influential
and beneficial.
While the material presented in these case studies
supports a plausible case for the positive impact of
state action, this is an area of analysis which needs
further work. Let us re-emphasise, however, that the
effectiveness of state action does not rest solely on the
net effects of any specific government's particular
economic policies, but is rooted in the basic nature of
the state itself and its overall relationship to society,
notably its impact on social structure and attitudes.
These latter provide the matrix within which specific
policies flourish or shrivel away.
To the extent that the East Asian states, both socialist
and capitalist, have been economically effective, how
do we account for their developmental capacity? All
three are clearly examples ofMyrdal's 'hard state', but
this fact rests on certain distinctive characteristics
which imperil generalisation: the historical legacy ofa
strong and economically active state, traditions of
social and political hierarchy; and strong nationalist
sentiments underpinned by cultural homogeneity and
reinforced by external threats.
These peculiarities notwithstanding, certain tentative
conclusions can be drawn which may contribute to
wider development debates. First, the experience of
our three East Asian cases should give pause to any
sweeping policy generalisations based on the alleged
economic omnipotence of either state planning or
markets. While earlier developmental economics can
be faulted for a certain blithe optimism about the
developmental capacity of states and for privileging
macro over micro economic factors, recent critics of
orthodox development economics can be faulted for
denigrating or downgrading the positive economic
potential of state action. East Asian experience points
to the need to establish a balance between state
planning and markets, a Markilenkung economy,
which accords a substantial role to the state as the
executor of a national economic interest. Second, this
central economic challenge confronts both socialist
and capitalist societies, though the political character
and social basis of the 'national economic interest'
may be very different. Third, as Moore argues for
Taiwan and Korea and White for China, the nature of
the relationship between state and society, planning
and markets must change along with different phases
of the industrialisation process if it is to remain
developmentally progressive. Fourth, the action of
development states should not be seen merely in terms
ofa state 'intervening' in an economy, which is in some
sense alien or discrete. The relationship between state
and economy is more organic and multifaceted and
the state's impact on economic changes depends
heavily on its broader, 'non-economic' social and
political influences. Thus, the search for a deeper
understanding of the economic role of the state, poses
a challenge not only to development economics but to
development studies as an interdisciplinary endeavour.
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